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As soon as a common carrier accepts goods for transpor-
tation he is responsible for their safe delivery against all
accidents except those that arise or such as are attributable
to first, the act of God or a public enemy, second, fraud of
the bailor, third, inherent defects in the goods themselves,
or fourth, the acts of public authorities, and such acts as
may be expressly excepted by his contract. Until delivery
this liability rests upon the common carrier and therefore it
becomes necessary to have an understanding as to the meaning
and significance given to the term delivery, and the essen-
tials which constitute a good delivery in the law of bailments
in order to ascertain when and how the common carrier's lia-
bility is ended. The rule as to delivery in general is that
the goods shall be delivered to the proper person at a reason-
able time and place and in the proper manner. All of these
elements must be present in order to constitute a good deliv-
ery, but any of them may be waived by express contract or by
the party entitled to the goods, as for instance, where bailee
accepts the goods without questioning the mode of delivery.
This would bar an action based on an irregularity in delivery
and so would any agreement between the common carrier and
bailee so far as the consignor is concerned.
There is an old rule which requires a personal delivery
of goods except in cases where goods are sent by ship from a
foreign port. In this class of cases there was an understood
and established custom that the goods were to be carried from
2port to port and that when landed at the port of destination
no further delivery was necessary, but among all other class-
es of common carriers a personal delivery to the consignee
at his place of residence or place of business was the cus-
tom.
The general rule as to the time of delivery is that it
shall be reasonable and within business hours. If, however,
a reasonable time has elapsed and a common carrier cannot make
a delivery by reason of no fault of his own, his liability
as common carrier and insurer, ceases, and he becomes a ware-
houseman. What is a reasonable time and how this liability
as insurer is thrown off, will be considered in treating of
carriers specifically.
"The manner in which common carriers are required to de-
liver has now become so well settled by judicial decision
that a case would seldom occur which could not be at once de-
termined without resort to proof of usage or custom."
It is still the duty of some classes of common carriers
to make a personal delivery of the goods, and when this obli-
gation is imposed upon the carrier, it is his duty to seek
the person to whom delivery is to be made and tender the goods
and the carrier can be discharged from this duty only by spec-
ial contract or by proof of an opposite usage.
In cases where the goods are addressed to a particular
house or number, the delivery and tender should be made at
that place, and if the consignee is not there a reasonably
diligent effort should be made to find him, and a question as
to what would constitute reasonable diligence is one for the
3jury to decide. If after reasonable diligence has been ex-
ercised, the consignee yet remains undiscovered, the carrier
may relieve himself from his insurance liability by placing
the goods in the hands of a warehouseman to hold for the own-
er.
It has become a well established rule that when carriers
by water or railway have deposited the goods consigned to them
at the nearest wharf or station to the consignee and have given
him notice of their readiness to deliver the goods, that they
have for a reasonable time after the removal of the goods by
the consignee has elapsed, become absolved from their liabil-
ity as carriers and are merely warehousemen bound to the ex-
ercise of ordinary diligence.
This rule does not apply to express companies who are
still required to make a personal delivery. In 55 Barb.
443, Whitbeck vs. Holland, it was held that an express com-
-any could not relieve itself from liability for not making a
personal delivery of goods entrusted to their charge by noti-
fying the consignee that they had a package addressed to him
and describing it. "Nothing short of a personal delivery
will suffice." In the case of Fenner vs. The Buffalo &
State Line R. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 505, three rules were laid down
and are in substance as follows : 1. If the consignee be
present upon the arrival of the goods he must remove them with-
out unreasonable delay. 2. If the consignee is not present
but lives at or in the immediate vicinity of the place of de-
livery, the common carrier must notify him of the arrival of
4the goods and he then has a reasonable time within which to
remove them. 3. If consignee is absent, unknown or cannot
be found, the carrier may place the goods in his freight house
and if the consignee does not call for them within a reason-
able time thereafter, his liability as common carrier ceases.
It seems just and right that a stear-oat line or carrier
by railway should not be obliged to make a personal delivery.
Their mode of conveyance is in one case by means of ships
upon water, and in the other by cars upon certain defined
tracks and over definite routes. It would be impossible for
them to deviate from their regular paths and a personal deliv-
cry could only be accomplished by compelling them to employ
additional conveyances to carry goods beyond or aside from
the main line. This would necessarily extend their business
very largely and necessitate an enormous capital.
Neither fraud, imposition or mistake will excuse the de-
livery of the goods to the wrong person, and it therefore be-
comes necessary to learn how a common carrier may protect
himself in delivering goods consigned to him, and under what
circumstances he can be held liable for a failure to deliver.
In the case of McEntee vs. The N. J. Steamboat Co., 45
N. Y. 34, it was held that an absolute refusal by a carrier
to deliver goods to a person entitled to receive them con-
stitutes a conversion of the goods, but if the refusal be
qualified and the.-qualification be reasonable and made in
good faith, it does not constitute a conversion. "Common
carriers deliver property at their peril and must take care
5that it be delivered to the right person, for if delivery be
to the wrong person, either by fraud or innocent mistake,
they will be responsible, and the wrong delivery will be
treated as a conversion." This holding has been followed
and expressed in a long line of cases and is well settled.
There is no doubt that the carrier has the right to refuse to
deliver the goods until he has had a reasonable time in which
to satisfy himself as to the true owner, provided the refus-
al is made in gaod faith, but he has no ground for refusing
if, after a reasonable time has elapsed and the owner has of-
fered to give a bond of indemnity to insure the common car-
rier against damage by reason of a delivery to a wrong per-
son. Such a refusal would be a conversion. Another way
in which the common carrier may be relieved from .the responsi-
bility of deciding between conflicting claimants is to com-
mence a suit in the nature of a bill of interpleader against
the various claimants and thus have their rights to the
property judicially settled.
It was decided in the case of The Gulf C. & S.F.R.Co.
vs. Freeman, 16 S.W.109 that a R.R.Co. is not liable for con-
version where it refuses to deliver goods to an unidentified
consignee, if he fails to produce a bill of lading, though he
may offer security.
The common carrier is liable for a misdelivery of goods
by reason of an innocent mistake or because of a fraud prac-
ticed upon the carrier and an action in trover may be maintain-
ed for such wrongful delivery. This has been held in cases
6where goods were delivered upon a forged order both with re-
gards to goods shipped as freight and as to the baggage of
a passenger.
In the case of Price vs. The Oswego & L.R.R.Co. 50N.Y.
113, it was held that where a common carrier without requir-
ing evidence of identity delivers goods to a stranger, which
have been fraudulently ordered by the latter in the name of a
fictitious firm and, which have been shipped in complicance
with the order to such fictitious firm ; he is liable to the
consignor for their value. It has further been held, that
althcugh the swindler presented the bill of lading, yet the
common carrier should have made inquiries as to his identity
and was liable for failure to do so.
There is a line of cases in which the carrier will not
be liable for a wrongful delivery as* where the consignor
thought that the consignee was another person and has been
induced, by fraud, to direct the delivery of the goods to such
consignee or, as in another case, where A fraudulently as-
suming the name of a reputable merchant in a certain town,
buys in person goods of another, the property of the goods
passes to A and the seller cannot maintain an action against
the common carrier, to whom the carriage of the goods is
entrusted, for delivering them to A, because the property
reached the person to whom the consignor sold and consigned
it and the common carrier had delivered it according to direc-
tions, thereby fulfilling his contract. The carrier would
7have been liable if, knowing of the fraud, he had failed to
thwart it, or if proper diligence on his part would have led
to its discovery. The rule as deduced from the authorities
is that a common carrier is bound to make delivery of goods,
put in his hands, according to their addresses, and they are
answerable for misdelivery by reason of fraud upon themselves
but not for fraud upon the shippers with which they are not
chargeable with notice. This rule applies to all classes
of common carriers including warehousemen and with particular
strictness to express companies.
As to delivery of goods to an agent of the consignee the
authorities maintain that a person claiming the right to re-
ceive the goods as agent for the consignee, must show the
fact of agency, or circumstances, which in the opinion of the
jury would justify such delivery, but no other proof of the
fact of agency is required than is necessary in other cases.
A case in 24 Minn. 269 lays down the test as follows : "A
single act of an assumed agent and a single recognition of
his authority by the principal, if sufficiently unequivocal,
positive and comprehensive in its character, may be suffi-
cient to prove an agency to do other similar acts."
Where goods are consigned to an owner, in care of an
agent of the carrier the delivery to the agent will exonerate
the carrier if there be a tacit understanding between the
parties. If the goods be consigned to the agent of the
carrier, it is his duty to make a personal delivery to the
8owner if be can he found and if not, to place the goods in a
warehouse for the consignee ; but if the warehouseman makes
a wrong delivery, the carrier Is liable to the consignee.
If goods are misdirected, and for this reason are lost
or damaged, the carrier, is not liable for such loss or dfriage
unless the proper direction could have been easily ascertained
by the carrier or the loss had occurred through his negli-
gence. If the goods be directed to a place that is not in
existence, and the carrier accepts them so directed, he is
liable until delivery. The carrier would also be relieved
from liability in a case where the goods had been misdirected
and the owner notified, and while awaiting direction they
were consumed by fire or otherwise damaged without negligence
on the part of the carrier. He would also be relieved where
a wrong delivery had been induced or ratified by the owner,
or if the unauthorized delivery had been ratified by the
consignee.
As the common carrier is responsible for the safe deliver
of goods as long as he remains in the position of a carrier,
it is necessary to know just when his carrier liabilities
cease and when his responsibility as warehouseman begins.
It may be stated, as a general rule, that when the carrier
has complied with all the requirements of the law, and for
some reason has failed to bring about the delivery and, the
goods continue to remain in his possession, he becomes, from
that time, a mere warehouseman or depositary.
Having treated of common carriers in general, a more
detailed account will be given by treating them specifically.
The common carriers known to the commercial world, have
separated themselves into distinct classes and, in order to
note the peculiar customs and usages recognized by these dif-
ferent classes, it becomes necessary to examine each separate-
ly. The first of these to be considered will be
Carriers by Water.
This class of carriers are excepted from making a person-
al delivery because the mode of transportation which they
employ makes a personal delivery impracticable.
After landing goods they must give the consignee notice
of their arrival and, if after this notice has been given, and
the consignee refuses to receive the goods, it becomes the
duty of the carrier to hold the goods for the owner, but if
the consignee is under an obligation to receive the goods,
they are at his own risk. In support of the proposition
that comon carriers bir water must give notice of the arrival
of goods, there is a line of cases of which 73 Il.. 506 is
the leading one, ard in which it was held that "Commion Car-
riers by water have always been required to give notice, of
the arrival of goods to the consignee, where his place of
abode was known and this rvle has not been relaxed as it has
been with railroads".
Among the chief iuties of carriers b water arethat
they shal. land tne goods at a suitable hour and during good
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weather, and that they shall provide a suitable place for the
goods to be left until the consignee calls for them. The
carrier is not justified in abandoning goods or in exposing
them to injury, and he is liable if he so acts, but the mode
of delivery is largely governed by usagce and custom, and a
common carrier may justify a delivery on these grounds.
The rule is, that a common carrier must deliver according to
usagiue of trade, whether the consignee knows of the usage or
not, and the common carrier is also held to this rule whether
he is aware of the custom or not, as he impliedly contracts
to deliver in the manner recognized among the same class of
carriers, under similar conditions.
The common carrier may rid himself of the obligation of
givig notice, by special contract, and this is often done
by a stipulation in the bill of lading waiving notice. If
the contract between the parties contains this provision, it
is the duty of the consignee to be ready to receive the goods
when they arrive and by his failure to do this the common
carrier ma:r land the goods upon the wharf, without giving
notice. This does not, however, relieve the carrier of all
responsibility as to the goods, and he is still liable if
loss occur by reason of his neglect in leaving the goods ex-
posed to peril.
As to what wharf the delivery should be made at is de-
termined largely by each case. If the carrier has a regular
route, he is obliged to make delivery at the nearest wharf
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to the consignee, or if he has a wharf at which he usually
delivers, a delivery at such a place would be sufficient.
The consignee may contract, with the carrier, to have the
delivery made at a particular place, in which case, the
terms of the contract should be complied with. Where the
carrier has no usual stopping place, the consignee may direct
a reasonable and convenient place where delivery shall be made
Railroads as Common Carriers.
This class of common carriers are not required to make a
personal delivery of the goods consigned to them, but the
laws as to delivery in general have been modified, to a con-
siderable degree, by the states, and there is no uniformly
settled rule throughout the United States.
The rule which is most liberal in its provisions to the
carrier is that upheld by the Courts of Massachusetts,
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Iowa, Georgia, Tennessee,
South & North Carolina, Missouri and California. This is
called the Massachusetts rule. By its provisions the carrier
need not make personal delivery or give notice to the consignee
His duty is simply to unload the goods from the cars and place
them upon the platform or in a warehouse, and after this has
been accomplished, they are relieved from their insurance
liabilitt and become warehousemen or depositaries.
To support this broad inclination in favor of the carrier
the courts argue that as to giving notice the arrivals of
goods are so numerous that it would be a very burdensome task
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for the carrier to give notice on the arrival of each consign-
ment of goods, and that the consignees are ordinarily warned
by a notice from the consignor that the goods have been ship-
ped. This is a broad assumption as very often the consignor
does not notify the consignee that the goods have been shipped
or if he has, the train on which they were shipped may have
been delayed by reason of a rush of business, or by various
other unforseen occurrences. The carrier provides safe and
commodious warehouses and these are under the charge of the
carrier's servants, and the goods therein exposed to the pos-
sibility of theft by the servants w-ith a far smaller chance
of detection than when the goods are on the cars, and yet the
liability has been decreased.
Water carriers are obliged to hold goods for a reason-
able time, until the owner has a chance to examine and remove
them, and there does not seem to be any good reason why this
rule should be relaxed in favor of land carriers.
The next departure from the general rules of delivery to
be considered is the rule laid down in New Hampshire, Ala-
bama, Wisconsin, Vermont, Kentucky, New Jersey, Louisiana,
Kansas and Ohio. This may be called the New Hampshire rule,
which was laid down in 32 N.H.,523, and which held that the
carrier was not obliged to give notice to the consignee of
the arrival of the goods, but if he leaves the goods in the
cars or puts them in his warehouse, he is liable as a common
carrier until the consignee has had a reasonable time in
which to inspect and remove the goods. This seems to be a
more just rule than that laid down by the Massachusetts
courts.
New York, ,ichigan and M'innesota require the carrier to
give the consignee notice of the arrival of the goods and hold
the carrier responsible for the goods as carrier until the
consignee has had a reasonable time in which to remove them.
This is a general statement of the rule, but a more minute
description is as follows. Tf the consignee be present upon
the arrival of the goods, he must take them away without un-
reasonable delay ; if he is not present but lives at or in
the immediate vicinity of the place of delivery, the carrier
must notify him of the arrival of the goods and then he has a
reasonable time in which to remove them ; if he is absent,
unkncwn,or cannot be found the common carrier may store them
and if after notice of the arrival of the goods, the consignee
has had a reasonable time in which to remove them and does
not, he cannot hold the common carrier as an insurer. This
is also the English rule.
Custom and usage may modify the requirements as to the
mode and place of delivery, as for instance, where the car-
rier has no warehouse at a small station, and has been in
the habit of leaving goods on the platform of the station.
If such could be shown to be the custom, it would be a defence
to a suit brought for damages caused by reason of such delivery
The consignee is regarded as living in the immediate
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vicinity of the depot and no indulgence as to the time al-
lowed for the removal of goods will be granted to him. He
must remove with reasonable diligence and by sufficient means.
The carrier is the insurer of the goods while removal is
taking place, provided it is done with diligence. The car-
rier may charge storage in addition to his fees for carrying
if the goods be left in his warehouse after a reasonable time
has elapsed. During the removal the carrier should facili-
tate the removal as much as possible, by giving the consignee
entrance and egress to the place where the goods are, and if
the consignee is obliged to take the goods from the cars, the
carrier should place the cars in such a position as to make
the removal convenient.
Express Companies.
In this branch of carriers where so many small and
valuable articles are carried, it would be impractical to
apply the same rules as are used to govern other carriers,
such as notice to the consignee of the arrival of the goods,
and provisions relating to the maintenance of suitable ware-
houses for the reception of goods after their arrival ; con-
sequently a personal delivery is required. This requirement
of personal delivery is somewhat relaxed in instances where
goods are sent to some small way station, where there is
not business enough to necessitate the employment of messen-
gers and delivery wagons. In such instances goods may be
left at the station a reasonable time until called for. In
order to defend such a delivery it must be shown that the
consignee knew this to be the established custom and further-
more he must have received prompt notice of the arrival of the
goods. The obligations of an express company as to delivery
may sometimes be modified considerably by custom, but the
courts are very reluctant to allow them to go beyond the ordi-
nary rules as to delivery. An express company as a coirron
carrier is bound to account for all goods given into its hands
for carriage and can only excuse a failure to make a proper
delivery by showing that the property was lost through an
act of God or of a public enemy.
In case goods are tendered to the consignee by the ex-
press company and refused, a very much debated question arises
as to what are the duties of the carrier.
Some cases in Tennessee and a few early New York cases
hold that after goods have been tendered and refused the duty
of the carrier is to place the goods in a warehouse. The
contract of carriage is at an end, and the carrier now as-
sumes the responsibility of a warehouseman. As there is no
extra compensation, he is liable only for gross negligence.
These decisions do not require the carrier to notify the
owner or consignor.
A case in 5 Wallace 481 and an Illinois case hold the
opposite view and require the carrier to give notice to the
owner of the goods and to hold them for a reasonable time.
If the consignee is absent from his place of residence,
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is unknown or cannot be found, and the carrier does all in
his power to effect a delivery and is unable to, the carrier
is discharged in case of loss.
The carrier may always infer that the consignee is the
owner, unless there are facts brought to his knowledge which
would compel him to know otherwise. This would occur if the
goods were sent C.O.D., in which case the carrier would be
bound to know that the consignor was the owner and would be
obliged to give him notice if the consignee refused to receive
the goods or if he was unknown, or for any reason could not
be found.
This obligation to give notice is only imposed upon such
classes of carriers as are required to make a personal de-
livery or to give notice of the arrival of goods..
Among express companies there is a peculiar custom which
seems to be entirely confined to this class of carriers and
this is the custom of sending goods C.O.D. The contract that
a consignor makes with the express company, when he sends
goods C.O.D., is that the carrier will carry as in all other
cases, but further that he will collect a certain amount of
money from the consignee before he delivers to him the goods,
and that he will return this money to the consignor.
Delivery and payment are concurrent acts and the letters
C.O.D., which simply mean "collect on delivery" imply that the
carrier shall not deliver up the goods until they are paid for
and if he does, he is liable for conversion in the same man-
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ner as if he had made a -rong delivery. This -rongful de-
livery may be ratified by the consignor and the carrier re-
leased. Trhen goods are delivered by the carrier with an in-
struction to collect on delivery, the consignee has a right to
inspect the goods and ascertain that they are what he expect-
ed. In such a case if the carrier is paid and the consignee
finds on examination that the goods are not satisfactory, he
may recover the money paid to the carrier. If, when the
goods are tendered by the carrier, the consignee is for some
reason unable to pay for them at the time, the carrier should
allow the consignee a reasonable time in which to pay for and
remove the goods. During the time that he thus holds the
goods, the carrier is a warehouseman, but if the goods are
refused by the consignee for other cause, the carrier should
return the goods to the consignor or give him notice of the
refusal.
The consignee being the implied owner of the goods, may
direct the carrier as to where the goods are to be delivered,
but if the carrier knows that the consignee is not the owner,
he should refuse to deliver in any manner different than
that directed by the owner and is liable for conversion if
he fails to do this.
Non-Delivery.
There are certain situations in which the carrier is ex-
cused from making delivery and perhaps the most important of
t'-.ese is where property is taken from the carrier under legal
process as by attachment.
The carrier is excused from making a delivery when he
is overpowered by a public enemy and it seems equally just
that he should be relieved from responsibility when goods are
taken by the authority of the law.
The courts of assachusetts in a case 104 Mass.159, laid
down the rule that the proceeding under which the goods are
seized must be against the owner of the goods. Tf the goods
were seized on a writ against the consignor for a debt which
he owes and it should turn out that the goods were the proper
ty bf the consignee, such seizure would be no defence of the
comton carrier for non-delivery. The seizure in such a case
would be a trespass on the part of the officer who made it
and an infringement upon the rights of the true owner of the
goods to which the carrier is not bound to yield, and if he
does he is liable to the owner. Tn a later case the rule
was carried still further, and in 117 M'as:i.591, it was decided
that the carrier must not yield to an execution levied upon
goods, which are by statute exempt from execution, and that
he is liable even if the goods are taken against his will or
without fraud or collusion on his part, or even if he is ig-
norant of the character of the goods.
The process under which the goods are seized must be
legal and valid and a seizure made under an illegal attach-
ment or execution is regarded as a trespass. If the carrier
knows the owner of the goods seized it is his duty to give him
prompt notice in order that he may have a chance to recover
or protect his property and carriers by water are obliged to
take appropriate measures to protect the owner's interest for
a reasonable time until he can be notified and assume the
burden of the litigation.
In "assachusetts a railroad company can be served with
tristee or garnishment process and may be summoned and
charged as a trustee. In such a case the company could set
this up as a defence when sued for non-delivery. This ques-
tion came up in another form in 417 Ill. 402 and was as fol-
lows : "('an a railroad company be liable to judgment on a
process of garnishment merely on the ground that it may have
had property in-transitu, on its route consigned to one who
may be a debtor at the time of issuing and serving the writ"?
It was held that the railroad company could not be so liable
and especially not if the goods were out of the county where
they were received by the carrier. VITt would be unreasonable
to subject the company to the cost, vexation and trouble of
such a process merely because it had received to be carried
that which the law compelled it to receive and carry".
Whenever the carrier or any other bailee becomes satis-
fied that the bailor is not the true owner of the goods, he
may surrender them on demand to the true owner, but the car-
rier cannot set up an adverse title of his own motion as an
excuse for withholding the goods from the bailor.
There is a strong presumption of ownership being in the
bailor which the carrier must rebut and the adverse claim
must be asserted by claimant or by his authority. If the
claimant notifies the co-mon carrier that he has a superior
title and requests him not to make a delivery, it seems that
the carrier would be safe in withholding delivery, but if
the claimant should be afterwards shown not to have a superi-
or title, the carrier would then be held liable to conver-
sion for withholding the goods. This leaves the carrier
in a delicate situation,for whichever course he pursues he
is likely to incur liability. To relieve himself of the re-
sponsibility of deciding between the rival claimants, he
may bring the parties into court, as defendants, on a bill
of interpleader and thus have their rights judicially settled.
In any case where demands are made on the carrier by
persons claiming to have a superior title to the goods, he
may have a reasonable time in which to decide on the merits
of the deands, provided that he acts in good faith.
Another excuse which the carrier may set up as a de-
fense for failure to make delivery is where the consignor
exercises his right of "Stoppage in-transitu", but this sub-
ject is so extensive that it cannot be given a more full
description in this discussion.
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With the foregoing description of the various excuses
which the carrier may set up as a defense for non-delivery,
this discussion ends, having traced the rules as to delivery
and carriage from the common iaw to the present time and in-
cluding the principal statutory modifications and exactions.

